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In the Sierra Leone Civil War, politically and 
militarily counterproductive actions were 
commonplace and atrocities were committed 
against those who offered support. Despite efforts 
of external powers to broker peace agreements, 
the various factions continued fighting. This study 
seeks to answer why the RUF was successful despite 
inferior numbers and strategies anathema to 
modern counterinsurgency doctrines. It analyzes 
how war legitimizes crime and the suppression of 
democratic politics, adding to the growing body 
of research on intrastate conflict and the political 
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“We fought ten years for nothing.”
–Gibril Massaquoi, spokesman for the RUF  
 high command 
“Conflict can create war economies, 
often in regions controlled by 
rebels or warlords and linked to 
international trading networks; 
members of armed gangs can benefit 
from looting; and regimes can 
use violence to deflect opposition, 
reward supporters, or maintain their 
access to resources. Under these 
circumstances, ending civil wars 
becomes difficult. Winning may not 
be desirable: the point of war may 
be precisely the legitimacy which it 
confers on actions that in peacetime 
would be punishable as crimes.”
–David Keen, The Economic Functions of  
 Civil Wars, 1998
Introduction
T his report challenges the assumption that the aim of war is to win. During the Sierra Leone Civil War (SLCW), politically and 
militarily counterproductive actions were 
commonplace, enemies routinely col-
laborated, and atrocities were committed 
against the same population from which 
both sides should have sought support.1 
The primary question that this report will 
attempt to resolve is why the RUF (Revo-
lutionary United Front) was so successful 
despite inferior numbers and barbarous 
behavior that rebuked modern counter-
insurgency doctrines. In order to address 
my primary question, I must examine the 
origins of the conflict as well as the eco-
nomic, political, and military objectives of 
the opposing sides—the RUF and the SLA 
(Sierra Leone Army)—and also how they 
achieved their goals. Thus, I ask several 
subsidiary questions: what role did the 
initial political, social and economic con-
ditions play in inviting the RUF interven-
tion? Was the RUF primarily concerned 
with the exploitation of Sierra Leone’s 
alluvial diamond mines or did the RUF 
have real political aspirations as well? How 
did diamonds—of little or no value to 
ordinary Sierra Leoneans other than their 
attraction to foreigners—help finance the 
decade-long conflict? Even more impor-
tantly, did control of alluvial diamonds 
provide an incentive for the SLA and 
the RUF to tacitly collude to indefinitely 
prolong the civil war so that they could 
maintain their unique access to Sierra Le-
one’s lucrative mineral wealth? And lastly, 
was the presence of the alluvial diamond 
mines and unprotected villages a major 
determinant of the RUF’s and the SLA’s 
sordid behavior towards non-combatants?
 In Sierra Leone, the civil war legiti-
mized various kinds of crime and the sup-
pression of democratic politics that served 
a multiplicity of local and individual goals. 
Importantly, this report examines if local 
and individual elements had a strong in-
centive to indefinitely prolong the civil war 
to maintain their economic and political 
benefits and even their lives. In support 
of this claim, it took a determined inter-
national force to tip the balance of power 
of the local interests and end the ten year 
long civil war.2 But, what are the impli-
cations of the RUF’s success? Does the 
protracted and seemingly unending na-
ture of the SLCW provide any lessons for 
structuring peace agreements when easily 
accessible natural resources are present? 
Many of the conditions illustrated in this 
report are not unique to Sierra Leone. Al-
though Sierra Leone was especially ripe 
for conflict, the implications gleaned from 
this report may be applicable to other 
states that are also suffering from brutal 
intrastate war that is caused and sustained 
by primarily economic factors and not real 
or perceived ethnic divisions. 
Background
The Political History of Sierra Leone
Upon the death of Sierra Leone’s first 
prime minister in 1964, politics in the 
country became increasingly character-
ized by corruption, mismanagement and 
electoral violence that ultimately led to a 
weak and cynical civil society, the collapse 
of the education system and a generation 
of dissatisfied youth who would eventu-
ally become the RUF.3 When President 
Siaka Stevens entered into politics in 1968 
Sierra Leone was a constitutional democ-
racy.4 When he stepped down—seventeen 
years later—Sierra Leone was a one-party 
state with a lower GDP than both Somalia 
and Rwanda.5 Steven’s rule, sometimes 
called “the seventeen year plague of lo-
custs,” saw the destruction and perversion 
of every state institution.6 Parliament was 
undermined, judges were bribed and the 
treasury was bankrupted to finance per-
sonal projects that funneled millions of 
dollars to insiders.7 When Stevens failed 
to coopt his opponents, he often resorted 
to state sanctioned executions or exile. In 
1985, Stevens stepped down and handed 
the nation’s preeminent position to Major 
General Joseph Momoh, a notoriously in-
ept leader who maintained the status quo.8 
During his seven year tenure, Momoh wel-
comed the spread of unchecked corruption 
and complete economic collapse. Unable 
to pay its civil servants, those desperate 
enough ransacked and looted government 
offices and property.9 But the government 
hit rock bottom when the treasury could 
no longer afford to pay schoolteachers and 
the education system collapsed.10 Because 
only wealthy families could afford to pay 
private tutors during the late 1980s, the 
bulk of Sierra Leone’s youth roamed the 
streets aimlessly. Corruption and mis-
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rule by Momoh and Stevens left ordinary 
citizens with nothing. The most pressing 
issues for these citizens were (and arguably 
still are) basic: land, shelter and justice. 
Major Actors
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
Organized in Liberia under the guidance 
and leadership of both Charles Taylor and 
Foday Sankoh, this rebel group during 
the spring of 1991 intervened in Sierra 
Leone in an attempt to overthrow the 
Momoh government and sparked a grue-
some ten year civil war that enveloped the 
entire country and left 50,000 dead.11 The 
RUF had several objectives in addition 
to financing and equipping its forces, but 
three were most important: crippling the 
government’s commercial and industrial 
activities, undermining the physical se-
curity of the state and attracting interna-
tional publicity to their cause.12 The main 
political goals of the RUF called were for 
the overthrow of the Momoh regime, the 
establishment of a multiparty democracy 
and an end to economic exploitation.13 
Although the RUF used populist rhetoric 
to legitimize its initial rebellion and at-
tract supporters, it continuously failed to 
articulate a coherent political agenda other 
than criticism that highlighted the short-
comings of the constantly changing gov-
ernment.14 It is conceivable that the RUF’s 
initial rebellion was in part motivated by 
the shortcomings of the government of 
Sierra Leone (GoSL), however as the war 
progressed, the RUF became increasingly  
enamored with the cumulative benefits of 
Sierra Leone’s profitable natural resources 
and not political power.15
Sierra Leone Army (SLA)
Originally a weak and rag-tag group, the 
SLA was largely impotent during the first 
year of the war.16 Within four years, how-
ever, the SLA had grown from under 4,000 
to over 17,000 troops by recruiting impris-
oned criminals and also by dragooning 
unemployed youths.17 But it is important 
to note that the local civilians referred to 
many of these new soldiers as “sobels” or 
“soldiers by day, rebels by night” because of 
their close ties to the RUF.18 With morale 
low and rations even lower, many SLA 
soldiers discovered that they could do 
better by joining with the rebels in loot-
ing civilians in the countryside instead of 
fighting against them.19 By mid-1993, the 
two opposing sides became virtually indis-
tinguishable.20
Executive Outcomes (EO)
For $1.8 million per month (financed 
primarily by the IMF), EO, a paramilitary 
group from South Africa, was paid to ac-
complish three goals: return the diamond 
mines to the government, locate and de-
stroy the RUF’s headquarters and operate 
a successful propaganda program that 
would encourage local Sierra Leoneans to 
support the GoSL.21 EO’s military force 
consisted of 500 military advisors and 
3,000 highly trained and well equipped 
combat ready soldiers backed by tactical 
air support and transport.22 Executive 
Outcomes employed black Angolans and 
Namibians from Apartheid South Africa’s 
old 32nd Battalion, with an officer corps of 
white South Africans.23 Harper’s Magazine 
described this controversial unit as a col-
lection of former spies, assassins and crack 
bush guerrillas, most of whom had served 
for fifteen to twenty years in South Africa’s 
most notorious counter insurgency units.24 
Civil Defense Force (Kamajors) 
A grassroots irregular force, the Kamajors 
operated invisibly in familiar territory and 
was a significant impediment to maraud-
ing government and RUF troops.25 For 
displaced and unprotected Sierra Leonans, 
the Kamajors was a means of taking up 
arms to defend family and home due to 
the SLA’s perceived incompetence and ac-
tive collusion with the rebel enemy.26 The 
Kamajors had a well-organized command 
structure and its members were trained 
in the use of modern weaponry.27 The 
Kamajors clashed with both government 
and RUF forces and was instrumental in 
countering government soldiers and rebels 
that were looting villages.28 The success of 
the Kamajors raised calls for its expansion, 
and members of street gangs and deserters 
were also co-opted into the organization.29 
However, the Kamajors became corrupt 
and deeply involved in extortion, murder 
and kidnappings by the end of the  
conflict.30
ECOMOG
The military branch of the Economic 
Community of West African States, this 
force intervened in the first days of the 
conflict and was most significant following 
the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFCR) coup.31 Condemning the AFRC 
coup, ECOMOG forces demanded that the 
new junta return power peacefully to the 
Kabbah government or risk sanctions and 
increased military presence.32
Geography and People
Sierra Leone is a small state—approxi-
mately the size of North Carolina—and 
lies on the West African coast.33 It is sur-
rounded by its larger neighbors: Guinea 
to the north and east, and both Liberia to 
the southeast and the Atlantic Ocean form 
its western border. Of the fourteen ethnic 
groups that settled in Sierra Leone, three 
groups—the Mende, Temne and Limba—
are the numerically the largest.34 Although 
real and imagined ethnic divisions have 
influenced political contests and military 
recruitment in the past, the SLCW was not 
characterized by ethnic strife.35 
The Demographics of RUF Recruitment
As a result of the Liberian Civil War, 
80,000 refugees fled neighboring Liberia 
for the Sierra Leone-Liberian border.36 
This displaced population, composed 
almost entirely of children, would prove 
an invaluable asset to the invading rebel 
armies because the refugee and detention 
centers, populated first by displaced Libe-
rians and later by Sierra Leoneans, helped 
provide the manpower for the RUF’s in-
surgency.37 Abandoned, starving and in 
dire need of medical attention, the RUF 
took advantage of the refugees poor condi-
tion by promising food, shelter, medical 
care and whatever profits they gleaned 
from looting and mining in return for 
their support.38 When this method of 
recruitment failed, as it often did for the 
RUF, youths were then coerced at the bar-
rel of a gun to join the ranks. After being 
forced to join, many child soldiers learned 
that the complete lack of law—as a result 
of the civil war—provided a unique op-
portunity for self-empowerment through 
violence and thus continued to support 
the rebel cause.39
Diamonds – The Natural Resource Curse
The Eastern and Southern districts in 
Sierra Leone, most notably the Kono and 
the Koido districts, are rich in alluvial dia-
monds, and more importantly, are easily 
accessible by anyone with a shovel, sieve, 
and transport.40 Since their discovery in 
the early 1930s, diamonds have been criti-
cal in financing the continuing pattern of 
corruption and personal aggrandizement 
at the expense of needed public services, 
institutions and infrastructure.41 The pres-
ence of diamonds in Sierra Leone invited 
and fed the civil war in several important 
ways. First, the highly unequal benefits 
incurred from diamond mining made 
ordinary Sierra Leoneans frustrated. For 
instance, the National Diamond Mining 
Corporation (NDMC)—DeBeer’s venture 
during the Steven’s government—was used 
to fund luxurious personal construction 
projects and extravagant salaries for gov-
ernment elites.42 With the RUF incursion, 
the formal diamond mining industry col-
lapsed; government sponsored diamond 
exports declined significantly during the 
civil war while Liberia, a state with very 
few diamond reserves, exported more 
than $2 billion worth of diamonds to Bel-
gium.43 This figure suggests that the profits 
garnered from the diamond trade with Li-
beria and other international clients were 
instrumental in financing both the RUF’s 
and even Charles Taylor’s war efforts in 
neighboring Liberia.  
 The RUF used funds harvested from 
the alluvial diamond mines to purchase 
weapons and ammunition from neighbor-
ing Guinea, Liberia and even SLA sol-
diers.44 Furthermore, the lack of external 
support made the control of the alluvial 
diamond mines that much more impor-
tant. Most significantly, the presence of 
easily extractable diamonds provided an 
incentive for violence. To maintain control 
of important mining districts like Kono, 
thousands of civilians were expelled and 
kept away from these important economic 
centers.45
 Although diamonds were a significant 
motivating and sustaining factor, there 
were other means of profiting from the 
civil war. For instance, gold mining was 
prominent in some regions.46 Even more 
common was cash crop farming through 
the use of forced labor.47 Looting during 
the Sierra Leone Civil War was not limited 
to diamonds, but also included that of 
currency, household items, food, livestock, 
cars, and international aid shipments.48 
For Sierra Leoneans who lacked access to 
arable land, joining the rebel cause was 
an opportunity to seize property through 
the use of deadly force. But the most im-
portant reason why the civil war should 
not be entirely attributed to conflict over 
the economic benefits incurred from the 
alluvial diamond mines is that the pre-war 
frustrations and grievances did not just 
concern that of the diamond sector. Con-
trary to some notable political economists, 
the root cause of SLCW was poor gover-
nance, poverty, and corruption, and the 
failure to create institutions that protected 
the freedoms of individual citizens.49
The Sierra Leone Civil War (March 23, 
1991 to January 11, 2002)
On March 23, 1991, The RUF, with support 
from the special forces of Charles Taylor’s 
revolutionary army, the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded East-
ern Sierra Leone.50 As the armies moved 
towards the interior of the country they 
looted, raped, and murdered innocent 
civilians causing a massive refugee move-
ment into the neighboring countries of Li-
beria and Guinea.51 The village of Koindo 
was a key target for the rebels during the 
initial incursion because it was an impor-
tant staging point for smuggling between 
Sierra Leone and Liberia.52 
 The initial rebellion could have easily 
been quelled in the first half of 1991.53 But 
But the most important reason why the 
civil war should not be entirely attributed 
to conflict over the economic benefits 
incurred from the alluvial diamond 
mines is that the pre-war frustrations and 
grievances did not just concern that of the 
diamond sector. 
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the RUF—despite being both numerically 
inferior and extremely brutal against civil-
ians—controlled two-thirds of Sierra Le-
one by the year’s end.54 The SLA’s equally 
poor behavior made this outcome possible. 
Often afraid to directly confront or un-
able to locate the elusive RUF, government 
soldiers were brutal and indiscriminate 
in their search for rebels or sympathiz-
ers among the civilian population.55 After 
retaking captured towns, the SLA would 
perform a “mopping up” operation in 
which the townspeople were transported 
to concentration camp styled “strategic 
hamlets” far from their homes in Eastern 
and Southern Sierra Leone under the pre-
tense of separating the population from 
the insurgents. However in many cases, 
this was followed by much looting and 
theft after the people were evacuated. This 
inevitably led to the alienation of many ci-
vilians and pushed some Sierra Leoneans 
to join the rebel cause. For these reasons, 
civilians increasingly relied on the Kama-
jors for their protection. 
 Within one year of fighting the RUF 
offensive had stalled, but it still remained 
in control of large territories in Eastern 
and Southern Sierra Leone, leaving many 
villages unprotected while also disrupting 
food and government diamond produc-
tion.56 Soon the government was unable 
to pay both its civil servants and the 
SLA.57 As a result, the Momoh regime lost 
all remaining credibility and a group of 
disgruntled junior officers led by Captain 
Valentine Strasser overthrew the govern-
ment on April 29, 1992.58 Strasser justified 
the coup and the establishment of the Na-
tional Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) 
by referencing the corrupt Momoh regime 
and its inability to resuscitate the economy, 
provide for the people of Sierra Leone and 
repel the rebel invaders.59 The NPRC’s 
coup was largely popular because it prom-
ised to bring peace to Sierra Leone.60 But 
the NPRC’s promise would prove to be 
short-lived.  
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 In March of 1993, with much help from 
ECOMOG troops provided by Nigeria, 
the SLA recaptured the Koidu and Kono 
diamond districts and pushed the RUF 
to the Sierra Leone-Liberia border. The 
RUF was facing supply problems as the 
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for 
Democracy (ULIMO) gains inside Liberia 
were restricting Charles Taylor’s NPFL’s 
ability to trade with the RUF.61 By the end 
of 1993, many observers thought that the 
war would soon be over because for the 
first time, the SLA was able to establish 
itself in the Eastern and the Southern min-
ing districts.62
 However, with senior government of-
ficials neglectful of the poor conditions 
faced by SLA soldiers, front line soldiers 
became resentful and began helping 
themselves to Sierra Leone’s rich natural 
resources. This included alluvial diamonds 
as well as looting and “sell game,” a tactic 
in which government forces would with-
draw from a town but not before leaving 
arms and ammunition for the roving reb-
els in return for cash.63 Abraham suggests 
that both sides not only had an interest in 
looting for personal enrichment, but also 
had a reason to collude so that the strained 
RUF could remain a formidable fighting 
force, prolonging the war to the benefit of 
both parties. Renegade SLA soldiers even 
clashed with Kamajor units on a number 
of occasions when Kamajors intervened 
to halt looting and mining.64 Furthermore, 
an end to the fighting would have made 
elections a certainty, ending the benefits 
that the NPRC military elites gained 
from holding office.65 Instead of working 
towards ending the war, SLA soldiers and 
NPRC elites appeared to be acting to pro-
long it.66 The war dragged on as a low in-
tensity conflict until January of 1995 when 
RUF forces and dissident SLA elements 
seized the Sierromco and Sierra Rutile dia-
mond mines in the South West, furthering 
the government’s economic struggles and 
enabling a renewed RUF advance on the 
capital at Freetown.67
 In March 1995, the South African mer-
cenary group EO arrived in Sierra Leone 
when the RUF was within twenty miles of 
Freetown.68 As a military force, EO was 
extremely skilled and conducted a highly 
successful counter insurgency against 
the RUF. In just seven months, EO, with 
support from loyal SLA and the Kamajors 
battalions, recaptured the diamond min-
ing districts and the Kangari Hills, a major 
RUF stronghold.69 A second offensive 
captured the provincial capital and the 
largest city in Sierra Leone and destroyed 
the RUF’s main base of operations near 
Bo, finally forcing the RUF to admit de-
feat and sign the Abidjan Peace Accord.70 
The hiring of EO seems to demonstrates 
that some elements within the National 
Provisional Ruling Council still wanted to 
repel the RUF invasion. Another explana-
tion is that the NPRC simply desired to 
protect the capital (and themselves) while 
regaining control of the profitable mining 
districts. In short, the efforts of EO forced 
Sankoh to cut his losses and enter into a 
ceasefire and peace process. This period of 
relative peace also allowed the country to 
hold elections during which the military 
junta handed power over to the democrati-
cally elected President Ahmad Tejan Kab-
bah in March of 1996.71
 The Abidjan Peace Agreement was 
signed on November 30, 1996.72 Abidjan 
mandated that EO was to pull out in five 
weeks after the arrival of a neutral peace-
keeping force. However, it soon became 
clear Sankoh and other hardline elements 
within the RUF did not want peace. The 
main stumbling block that prevented 
Sankoh from signing the agreement soon-
er was the number and type of peacekeep-
ers that were to monitor the ceasefire.73 
Had the RUF leadership legitimately want-
ed to end the conflict, they would have 
requested more, not fewer, peacekeepers. 
Despite the RUF’s loss of strongholds in 
the Kangari hills and Kailahun districts 
and widespread food and ammunition 
shortages, many rebels still did not sur-
render because they were extremely fearful 
of retribution from the now ruling Kab-
bah regime and the Kamajor. In January 
of 1997, the new democratically elected 
government of Sierra Leone—beset by 
demands to reduce expenditures by the 
IMF—ordered Executive Outcomes (EO) 
to leave the country, even though a neutral 
monitoring force had yet to arrive.74 The 
embryonic peace process began to collapse 
almost as soon as Abidjan was signed be-
cause of renewed Kamajor attacks and the 
fear of punitive tribunals following demo-
bilization kept many rebels in the bush 
despite their dire situation. 
 On March 25, 1997, a group of dis-
gruntled SLA officers freed and armed 
600 prisoners from the Pademba Road 
prison in Freetown.75 One of the prison-
ers, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, emerged 
as the leader of the coup and the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)—
the new GoSL.76 After blessing from the 
captured and imprisoned Foday Sankoh, 
RUF fighters—who were supposedly on 
their last legs—were ordered out of the 
bush to participate in the coup.77 Without 
hesitation and encountering only light re-
sistance from SLA loyalists, 5,000 rag-tag 
rebel fighters marched one hundred miles 
and overran the capital.78 Without fear or 
reluctance, RUF and SLA dissidents then 
proceeded to parade peacefully together. 
In short, the coup had been planned in 
conjunction with the RUF leadership.79 
Koroma then invited Sankoh to join his 
government, and appointed him Deputy 
Charirman of Mining after appealing to 
Nigeria (where he was imprisoned) for his 
release.80 The joint AFCR/RUF leadership 
then proclaimed that the war had been 
won, and a great wave of looting and re-
prisals against civilians in Freetown under 
the auspice of: ‘Operation Pay Yourself ’ 
followed.81 President Kabbah, surrounded 
only by his bodyguards, left by helicopter 
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for exile in nearby Guinea. 
 Condemning the AFRC coup, ECO-
MOG forces demanded that the new junta 
return power peacefully to the Kabbah 
government or risk sanctions and in-
creased military presence.82 Starting at the 
Lungi aiport, ECOMOG forces formed 
a three-pronged attack that surrounded 
the capital of Freetown.83 Overcoming en-
trenched AFCR positions, the ECOMOG 
forces retook the capital and reinstated the 
Kabbah government but let the rebels flee 
without further harassment.84 However, 
the regions lying just beyond Freetown 
proved much more difficult to pacify.85 
In summation, ECOMOG’s intervention 
in Sierra Leone brought a tentative peace 
that also reestablished the Kabbah regime 
through negotiated talks with the RUF/
AFCR rebels.86 Unable to push the AFCR/
RUF rebels from South and Eastern Sierra 
Leone, the Kabbah regime was forced to 
make serious concessions in the coming 
year.
 Given that Nigeria was due to recall its 
ECOMOG forces without achieving a tac-
tical victory over the RUF, the internation-
al community intervened diplomatically 
to promote negotiations between the RUF/
AFRC rebels and the newly reinstated Kab-
bah regime.87 The Lome Peace Agreement, 
signed on July 7, 1999 is controversial in 
that Sankoh was pardoned for treason, 
granted official status at the Vice President, 
and made chairman of the commission 
that oversaw the entirety of Sierra Leone’s 
diamond mines.88 In return, the RUF 
was ordered to demobilize and disarm its 
armies through a process of disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration.89 The 
Lome Peace Agreement was not particu-
larly popular with the people of Sierra 
Leone because Sankoh, the commander of 
the unimaginably brutal and treasonous 
RUF, was now handed the second most 
powerful position in the country and even 
more importantly, control over all of Si-
erra Leone’s lucrative diamond mines.
 Following the Lome Peace Agreement, 
several renegade elements within the RUF, 
like the “West Side Boys,” would require 
not only a 17,500 man UN intervention 
but also a British intervention to finally tip 
the balance of power and end the war de-
cisively on January 11, 2002.90 By most es-
timates, over 50,000 people lost their lives 
in the Sierra Leone Civil War.91 Countless 
more fell victim to the reprehensible and 
perverse behavior of the combatants. That 
May, hundreds of thousands of Sierra 
Leoneans reelected President Kabbah, and 
the RUF failed to gain a single seat in par-
liament.92 A victor was never proclaimed, 
and it is evident that all parties involved 
in the Sierra Leone Civil War had gained 
little in the end.
Analysis
Patrimonial System of Rule
The Sierra Leone Civil War was the result 
of decades of state neglect and exploita-
tion. To better understand the civil war, it 
is paramount to remember the decades of 
political collapse that enabled a dysfunc-
tional state system to perpetuate a pat-
rimonial system of rule. In Sierra Leone, 
patron-client relationships have extended 
well past the time of colonial rule and have 
become commonplace in the modern po-
litical system.93 This system of entrenched 
patron-client relationships allowed the 
GoSL to exclude almost all of society from 
any tangible economic development or 
political representation.94 In societies that 
are organized along patron-client lines, 
the state still extracts and distributes 
resources, however the extraction and 
distribution is privatized and therefore the 
interests of the society suffer immensely at 
the hands of small but powerful individual 
and group interests.95 In political systems 
that are typified by entrenched patron-
client relationships, politics becomes a 
business because political power controls 
the distribution of economic resources.96 
Thus, politics becomes economics. Con-
sequently, life during the SLCW became a 
competition for the distribution of already 
scarce resources and had disastrous conse-
quences.97 
 A history typified by underdevelop-
ment, single party rule, and widespread 
corruption generated a yearning for revo-
lutionary change—especially amongst the 
youth of Sierra Leone.98 Anger at the exist-
ing political system was pervasive, and 
many youths concluded that the unfair 
system of exploitation justified their often 
violent attempts at obtaining prosperity. 
But most importantly, this great divide be-
tween the “haves” and the “have-nots” of 
Sierra Leone made the country particular-
ly receptive to the RUF’s 1991 invasion.99 
The RUF’s initial rebellion was an attempt 
to address the grievances of those at the 
bottom of a political system that failed to 
provide even basic state services. It was 
only in this environment of utter state col-
lapse that such levels of sustained violence 
could be maintained.
The Economization of the Sierra Leone 
Civil War
While political rationality is difficult to 
find in the rebels’ and the government’s of-
ten counterproductive tactics, some sem-
blance of economic rationality was more 
evident throughout the conflict. If one 
The Sierra Leone Civil War was the 
result of decades of state neglect and 
exploitation. 
takes a narrow conception of rationality as 
pursing ones interests by the most efficient 
means possible, then making money at the 
expense of unarmed civilians while avoid-
ing open confrontation with other armed 
groups becomes perfectly rational. This 
does not mean that the rebels or govern-
ment dissidents were primarily motivated 
by greed instead of grievance. Grievances 
stemming from Sierra Leone’s low level of 
development—e.g. perpetual poverty, poor 
healthcare and non-existent education 
system—invited and sustained the RUF 
invasion. Thus, one of the RUF’s motivat-
ing factors in intervening in Sierra Leone 
was the desire to overthrow the neglectful, 
authoritarian and self-interested Momoh 
regime.But Sierra Leone’s rich natural 
resources and easily lootable commodities 
also invited the RUF invasion and pro-
longed the conflict. 
Protracted Nature of Conflict
Although reformist or revenge based mo-
tivations motivatedinvited the rebel inva-
sion to some extent, the attainment of the 
alluvial diamonds mines and material re-
sources from looting and theft increasingly 
became the overarching motivation for 
prolonging the insurgency.100 This does not 
mean that the rebel forces did not wish to 
overthrow the government, but rather that 
the rebel factions wanted to gain political 
control as a means of maintaining their 
access to the vital economic resources.101 
The alluvial diamond mines and raids on 
villages were very real means of economic 
advancement for both sides in the civil war 
and were powerful incentives to prolong 
the conflict indefinitely so that they could 
extend their presence in these remote 
areas. The RUF, and the SLA to a lesser 
extent, relied heavily on mining and loot-
ing to sustain their operations.102 Through 
the illegal diamond trade with neighbor-
ing Liberia, the RUF generated $75 million 
annually which was then used to purchase 
arms, ammunition and equipment.103 In 
a weak state like Sierra Leone, control of 
the political center was not necessarily the 
most efficient means of achieving wealth 
and power. For the impoverished and 
under-educated youth that constituted the 
RUF, the alluvial diamonds mines were an 
easy means of improving one’s well-being. 
For the RUF, warfare for expropriation 
became its raison d’etre. It is conceivable 
that if the RUF failed to maintain control 
of the alluvial diamond mines or refrained 
from theft and robbery, then the conflict 
would have likely fizzled out by the end 
of the year given forceful government op-
position.104
Fragmentation of Warring Parties
In other intrastate conflicts that did not 
involve a wealth of natural resources, only 
a small number of warring parties openly 
confront each other because only a few 
groups are capable of financing the war 
effort.105 But the SLCW is different from 
other intrastate conflicts in that the oppos-
ing factions were fragmented and numer-
ous.106 In Sierra Leone, the rich benefits 
that could be reaped from the alluvial 
diamond fields and unprotected villages, 
towns and cities enabled numerous actors 
to emerge because they could finance their 
independent operations. This fragmenta-
tion was such that some rebels had little 
or no connection to that of Sankoh’s RUF, 
as demonstrated by the renegade elements 
within the RUF that were reluctant to 
demobilize following Lome even when 
Sankoh was awarded the Vice Presidency 
and control of the country’s alluvial dia-
mond mines. Both the RUF and the SLA 
fragmented once in contact with the rich 
alluvial diamond mines. These rogue ele-
ments within the RUF, like that of the 
“West Side Boys,” even fought against RUF 
forces during the late 1990s.107
Brutalization of Civilizations
The economic opportunities provided by 
the civil war coupled with the fragmenta-
tion in the chain of command allowed 
groups on both sides to brutalize citizens 
with little recourse.108 During the SLCW, 
low ranking SLA and RUF soldiers com-
mitted violent atrocities against non-com-
batants, because they did not have to fight 
for the support of the local population 
when the economic benefits derived from 
mining and looting increasingly replaced 
their desire for political control.109 But 
even when political control was desired as 
in the case of RUF elites like Sankoh, the 
profits earned from the diamond trade 
could be used to achieve political office 
through bribery or violent insurrection. 
Furthermore, the SLA could loot and 
pillage because it could rely on external 
powers like ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, or 
the British to protect the political center. 
With actors on both sides less reliant on 
the civilian population for support be-
cause of profits earned from the diamond 
trade, the belligerents’ main rational from 
refraining from egregious acts of violence 
was essentially marginalized. Moreover, as 
the civil war progressed, groups from both 
sides increasingly recruited criminals and 
derelicts to join their respective ranks.110 
This, coupled with independent factions 
that were able to operate free of the cen-
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In our perverse world, civilians are 
sometimes feared simply because they 
are representative of some unknown and 
therefore possibly dangerous element.
tralized chain of command, led to abuses 
against civilians during the SLCW that 
were high relative to counter counterinsur-
gency doctrine.
 But both economic and political moti-
vations are sometimes inadequate justifi-
cations for the RUF’s and the SLA’s simply 
barbaric and unnecessary level of violence. 
According to Human Rights Watch, 7,635 
corpses were buried as a result of the 
January 1999 incursion into Freetown.111 
Keen suggests that the AFCR/RUF rebels 
feared civilians and their militias because 
they stood beyond the system of collusion 
and therefore posed a substantial threat 
to their security.112 By passing or harbor-
ing important information, civilians can 
hurt or betray, particularly because civil-
ian women and children are not usually 
suspected. In our perverse world, civilians 
are sometimes feared simply because they 
are representative of some unknown and 
therefore possibly dangerous element. The 
ever increasing effectiveness of the CDFs 
Kamajors also added to the RUF’s fear of 
the civilian population. Given that the 
Kamajors could not easily be targeted, in-
discriminate and gruesome attacks against 
civilians became common as the Kamajors 
grew in strength.
Conclusions and Implications 
All in all, access to Sierra Leone’s rich 
natural and material resources—the allu-
vial diamond mines and unprotected vil-
lages—enabled both sides to finance a war 
that was increasing fought for economic 
motivations. The great wealth reaped from 
the vital economic centers had three pri-
mary effects. First, it enabled the fragmen-
tation of both sides, because the individual 
detachments could break away from their 
former leadership and still fund their mili-
tary campaigns with the income that they 
generated from mining and looting. Addi-
tionally, the diamond mines and material 
goods gained from theft were often used 
for personal enrichment thus reinforcing 
the economic motivation to continue the 
insurgency. Sadly, the fragmentation of 
the warring parties and economic ben-
efits gained from criminal and extractive 
efforts facilitated the brutalization of the 
civilian population because the lower 
ranks within the warring parties increas-
ingly lost interest in political control. 
When the primary motivation of sustain-
ing the war is the extraction of resources 
for personal enrichment, then it is more 
likely that both sides would be less 
inhibited to commit atrocities against 
civilians.113 Coupled with an increasing 
number of criminals and thugs that con-
stituted the armies of both sides, the civil 
war took a barbaric turn. When civil war 
is no longer framed as a political contest 
for control of the state, but instead de-
volves into an economic contest between 
individual, local and foreign elements, 
then it can be assumed that the manner 
in which the civil war will be fought will 
differ greatly from other intrastate con-
flict in which economic motivations play 
little role. 
 Although the focus of this report has 
concerned itself with only the SLCW, 
this analysis has similar implications 
for other cases in which the actors have 
access to valuable natural resources and 
real and imagined ethnic divisions are 
negligible. Importantly, these findings 
may improve our understanding of how 
to prevent civil war and also how to re-
solve them successfully. But even more 
importantly, if the actors in the Sierra 
Leone Civil War had access to economic 
and political advancement through other 
means than just civil war, then the exist-
ing conditions that invited the invasion 
would largely be marginalized and thus 
there would be little reason for conflict. 
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